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Author response: No need for throwing stones eWherever you live…
Wewelcome a constructive debate on themerits of rigorous and
ecologically valid research on cognitive bias in forensic decisions. In
our editorial we tried to highlight the need for a deeper under-
standing of cognitive bias by drawing on a recent literature review
by Cooper and Meterko [1]. We acknowledge the important work
Kukucka and other colleagues have made in their effort to identify
and understand bias. However, we have reservations regarding his
interpretation of our methodological criticisms and of our position
regarding the research on bias.
In his refutation, Kukucka [2] argues that wemisrepresented the
methodological rigor of existing research on cognitive bias. In addi-
tion, he claims that we endorsed a problematic interpretation of
bias in forensic decision making. We will respond to each point in
turn.
1. Reactivity
In contrast to Kukucka’s claim that only 1 of the 29 studies in
Cooper and Meterko’s [1] review show critical deficiencies, we
would stand by our original assessment that a number of studies
did not have adequate blinding procedures. Cooper and Meterko
[1] repeatedly raised the issue of blinding in their review. On
page 42 they write: “As noted previously, we identified two studies
with critical deficiencies relating to participant blinding and to
comparability of groups. Among the other studies, design elements
fell short of what we considered ‘ideal’, either because important
details were not reported or because specific standards were not
met.” They further state: “The extent of blinding also varied among
the studies, with some studies designed in a way that prevented
participants from knowing that a particular sample was a study
sample, and other studies only blinding participants to the specific
hypothesis or to group allocation.” Their table in the appendix in-
cludes “evidence of a failure of participant blinding” and “evidence
of failure of blinding, affecting participant behaviour or assessors’
decision-making”, suggesting that issues around blinding and/or
reporting of blinding went beyond the single study acknowledged
by Kukucka. Besides, it is always possible to raise standards. In
medical or pharmaceutical research “double-blind procedures”,
where neither the participant nor the experimenter knows which
condition has been administered, are seen as the “gold standard”.
2. Randomization and generalizability
Kukucka correctly states that Cooper andMeterko [1] concluded
that only one reviewed study showed critical deficiencies in
randomization. However, in our editorial we wrote: “None of the
29 reviewed studies provided information about randomization
of trials” which echoes the following statement by Cooper and
Meterko [1]: “none of the studies provided information about the
randomization procedures”. We argue that information about
randomization of trials and conditions would reassure readers
that carry-over/order effects were avoided.
Our comment about differences between experimental and con-
trol groups refers to the lack of detailed demographic information.
Kukucka states “As every scientist knows, participants must be
randomly assigned to conditions in order to establish causality; in
theory, this practice creates two groups that are, on average, iden-
tical apart from the experimental manipulation”. This statement is
surprising, because in the previous paragraph Kukucka argues that
a lack of reporting demographics is hardly a “fatal flaw”. Yet, how
can we rest assured that experimental and control groups are
equivalent when no demographic information about the groups is
available? We stated accordingly: “Many of the reviewed studies
did not address differences between experimental and control
groups”.
Kukucka further asserts that “There is simply no evidence that
cognitive bias is moderated by a person’s age, sex or race”, citing
a paper on demand characteristics that is not an empirical study
on demographic differences [4]; and was published in 1962. This
misses the point as we need to check whether randomization
was successful. For smaller sample sizes stratified sampling or
matched sampling rather than convenience sampling is often the
preferred randomization strategy [5]. We stand by our original
claim and suggest that research into forensic bias should make an
effort to report the demographic variables of participants in
different groups; particularly since reported sample sizes have
been relatively small.
Kukucka tries to convince the reader that sample sizes have
increased over time by performing a linear regression on 19 data
points. Analysing this data is problematic, not only because the
number of studies is low, but also because one outlier (a recent
study with N ¼ 192 deviates almost 4 SDs from the mean) drives
the significant increase. Kukucka examined only total sample sizes,
regardless of the number of groups in different research designs. He
included studies from 2006-onwards but not earlier studies (e.g.,
two studies from 1987 and 1984). Nevertheless, if we repeat the
analysis without the outlier then publication date is no longer a sta-
tistically significant predictor of total sample size (b¼ 3.16, t¼ 1.73,
p ¼ .103). His conclusion that “sample sizes have steadily increased
over time” is therefore unconvincing, if not misleading.
In the following we assess the two studies in Kukucka and Kas-
sin [6] to illustrate some of our methodological concerns. We
acknowledge, however, that different studies warrant different
criticisms.
3. Sampling
We stated that Kukucka and Kassin [6] did not report
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demographic information about their participants beyond their
status as psychology undergraduate students. Obviously, this was
an error as we mixed up information about the pilot study with
Study 1 and we apologise for this mistake. Nevertheless, Kukucka
and Kassin [6] did not provide demographics for the between-
subjects groups. As a consequence, there is little reassurance that
their random assignments produced comparable groups. Study 1
used a “snowball sample” using social media whereas Study 2
employed representative sampling from the general population.
In Study 2, the sampling from the general populationmay be repre-
sentative for jurors but is unlikely to generalize to handwriting ex-
aminers. Although the group sizes seem sufficiently large, no power
analysis was conducted to determine optimal participant numbers.
Especially, in Study 2 there was unexplained variability of re-
sponses at Time 1 (before any contextual information had been
shown) across the three groups, indicating considerable group dif-
ferences. Statistically significant differences between Time 1
(before any contextual information had been shown) and Time 2
(confession-present) were observed for similarity and matching,
but the non-significant difference in the similarity variable at
Time 2 between the control, confession absent group and the
confession-present group remains unexplained.
4. Multiple testing
Three dependent variables were collected together with two
additional confidence ratings. Participants rated in succession “sim-
ilarity of handwritings”, “possible match” and “guilt”. This makes
each participant “judge and jury”, possibly inflating correspon-
dences between similarity ratings and subsequent judgments on
possible matches and the guilt of the suspect. Using three depen-
dent variables also increases the chances of finding statistically sig-
nificant effects through multiple testing [7]. No adjustments of
significance levels are reported (e.g., Bonferroni, Newman-Keuls).
5. Accuracy and ecological validity
In Study 1, two pairs of handwritings with low similarity and
two pairs with high similarity were selected, based on ratings of
15 pairs in the pilot study. Throughout the paper the authors do
not take into account that the four selected handwriting pairs
were from different persons; whereas the only pair that was auth-
ored by the same personwas not included.Whenmaking decisions,
forensic examiners can make four types of responses to targets
(hits, misses) and foils (correct rejections, false alarms). Without
any responses to targets (hit, misses) it is difficult to evaluate deci-
sion performance of participants because only one type of error and
correct response is observed [8]. The same argument applies to
Study 2. In conclusion, these shortcomings cast doubts on the inter-
pretation and ecological validity of the results.
On the second point - the alleged misinterpretation of cognitive
bias - we refer the reader to our recent reply to a letter by Thomp-
son (see Curley et al. [9,10], and Thompson [11]). In this reply we
acknowledge that bias, regardless of the interpretation by individ-
uals or organisations, does exist in forensic decision making. We
point out that task-irrelevant contextual information is difficult to
define, especially in terms of probative value in multi-phase
forensic decisions, and that we do not endorse the use of task-
irrelevant contextual information in forensic decisions. We
acknowledge the problems associated with cognitive bias, but do
not necessarily see it as a “scourge” that can and needs to be erad-
icated in every instance. On the contrary, we believe that certain
biases which have no or a positive impact on accuracy should be
explored in more detail. We believe that a perception of bias that
is too narrow (e.g., bias can only be negative) comes from a lack
of appreciation surrounding bounded rationality and decision mak-
ing literature in general (Gigerenzer & Brighton [12]).
We also note that Kukucka did not comment on our statement
that “Several results sections did not include basic statistical infor-
mation such as effect size, measures of variability and/or inferential
test statistics; some worryingly even conducted inappropriate sta-
tistical tests” [9]. Indeed, in his letter, Kukucka treats everymethod-
ological issue separately from each other, as if, for example, issues
with randomization should not be considered alongside participant
blinding or sample sizes. In reality, these issues interact with and
conflate one another and consequently should be treated together.
We stand by our conclusion that these problems are significant and
are worth considering when interpreting evidence of cognitive bias
in forensic decision making.
6. Summary
We believe that research on cognitive bias needs to move on
from illustrating the existence of bias in different examples to
exploring and quantifying the underlying causes and effects in
more ecologically valid settings (maybe inspiration can be drawn
from the seminal work of Itiel Dror in relation to creating more
ecologically valid studies [13]: How strong is the effect of contex-
tual information for different examiners and probes in various sce-
narios? Where to draw the line between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant contextual information? When are participants repre-
sentative of a population of forensic examiners and when is the se-
lection and administration of stimuli/cases ecologically valid?
Further, more research into jurors and how they integrate forensic
information is needed - particularly when they are aware that
forensic examiners used task-irrelevant information in their
decisions.
These questions suggest renewed research efforts. It seems
obvious that simply manipulating contextual information (present,
absent) in different forensic domains (fingerprint, dental, footprint,
tools, DNA) and observing responses in diverse samples (practi-
tioners, trainees, naïve participants) is insufficient to understand
the causes and effects of cognitive bias. New studies may specify
random factors that contribute to overall variability (participants,
stimuli/cases) using improved measures, designs and analyses in
order to quantify individual as well as stimulus-specific bias.
Crossed/mixed-effect designs and hierarchical models with more
ecologically valid material and samples may be a way forward.
Of course, it is easy to criticise limitations and shortcomings of
previous studies rather than to conduct new research. However,
we don’t see this as “throwing stones” as Kukucka puts it. Instead,
by engaging in constructive debate, building on past research, and
suggesting new avenues we are trying to encourage and facilitate
scientific progress.
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